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1 Introduction
Aggregation and deliberation are often contrasted as two very di¤erent ap-
proaches to collective decision-making. While aggregation is the merging of
conicting individual opinions into a social outcome, deliberation involves the
discussion of these opinions and their possible revision by the individuals de-
liberating.1 Jon Elster (1986, p. 112) summarizes the di¤erence between the
two approaches as follows: The core of the [deliberative approach] ... is that
rather than aggregating or ltering preferences, the political system should
be set up with a view to changing them by public debate and confronta-
tion. He continues, there would [then] not be any need for an aggregation
mechanism, since a rational discussion would tend to produce unanimous
preferences.
The contrast between the two approaches is probably overstated. More
plausibly, they are complementary rather than contradictory, with deliber-
ation often preceding aggregation (Miller 1992, Knight and Johnson 1994,
Dryzek and List 2003). Nonetheless, social choice theory, arguably our best
formal theory of collective decision-making, has focused mostly on aggre-
gation and said relatively little about deliberation. Game theorists have
recently given more attention to deliberation, investigating for example the
incentives for and against truth-telling in deliberative settings (e.g., Austen-
Smith and Feddersen 2006, Calvert 2006, Landa and Meirowitz 2006, Hafer
and Landa forthcoming), but we still lack a social-choice-theoretic model of
the transformation of opinion in deliberation. The aim of this paper is to
contribute to lling this gap in the literature.
I model opinions as judgments  acceptance or rejection  on certain
propositions, drawing on the emerging theory of judgment aggregation.2 The
1On deliberative democracy, see, for example, Cohen (1989), Dryzek (1990, 2000),
Fishkin (1991), Gutman and Thompson (1996), Bohman and Rehg (1997).
2Inspired by the doctrinal and discursiveparadoxes (Kornhauser and Sager 1986,
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propositions may be logically interconnected, so that the judgments on some
propositions constrain those that can rationally be held on others. This way
of modelling opinions is very general. As illustrated below, it can represent
not only beliefs but also preferences. While the theory of judgment aggre-
gation focuses on judgment aggregation functions, I here analyse what I call
judgment transformation functions. Such a function maps each admissible
prole of individual sets of judgments on the given propositions not to a
collective set of judgments on them (as an aggregation function does), but
to another, possibly revised prole of individual sets of judgments. The in-
put prole represents the individualspre-deliberation judgments, the output
prole their post-deliberation judgments. The process may or may not lead
to consensus.
To develop an axiomatic approach to studying judgment transformation,
I present a baseline impossibility result. It shows that, when the propositions
under consideration are non-trivially interconnected, any judgment transfor-
mation function satisfying some initially plausible conditions must be max-
imally conservative: it must be the identity function, under which nobody
ever changes his or her judgment on anything. The conditions, informally
stated, are the following. First, any prole of rational individual judgment
sets is admissible as input to the deliberation (universal domain). Second,
the output of the deliberation is also a prole of rational individual judgment
sets (rational co-domain). Third, if there is unanimity on every proposition
Pettit 2001), judgment aggregation was formalized by List and Pettit (2002, 2004), com-
bining Arrows (1951/1963) axiomatic approach to social choice theory with a logical
representation of propositions. Further results and model extensions were provided by
List (2003, 2004), Pauly and van Hees (2006), Dietrich (2006, forthcoming), Nehring and
Puppe (2005), van Hees (forthcoming), Dietrich and List (forthcoming a, b), Dokow and
Holzman (2005) and Pigozzi (2006). Judgment aggregation theory is closely related to ab-
stract aggregation theory, e.g., Wilson (1975), Rubinstein and Fishburn (1986), Nehring
and Puppe (2002), and to the theory of belief merging (Konieczny and Pino Pérez 2002).
3
before deliberation (not just on a single one), this is preserved after deliber-
ation (unanimity preservation); fourth, the individuals do not always ignore
their pre-deliberation judgments in forming their post-deliberation judgments
(minimal relevance); and fth, the deliberation focuses on one proposition
at a time (independence/systematicity).3
Since only a degenerate deliberative process in which there is no opin-
ion change satises these ve conditions together, I consider relaxing some
of them so as to avoid this negative result. I argue that, except in special
cases, the rst four conditions are hard to give up, but that the fth inde-
pendence/systematicity is a plausible candidate for relaxation. Thus the
impossibility result shows that successful group deliberation as envisaged by
deliberative democrats requires some kind of holism: individuals cannot gen-
erally revise their judgments on each proposition based on judgments on that
proposition alone. The revision must take judgments on other propositions
into account too. I give some examples of feasible judgment transformation
functions, distinguishing between those that generate consensus and those
that generate something less than consensus.
Throughout the paper, I relate my approach to other works on the inter-
section between social choice theory and deliberative democracy. Other im-
portant related contributions include the Alchourrón-Gärdenfors-Makinson
theory of belief revision (1985), whose focus, however, is on a single individ-
uals belief change in response to new information rather than belief revision
in groups, and the theory of conciliation and consensus in belief merging
(Konieczny 2004; Gauwin, Konieczny and Marquis 2005), whose key concept
 a conciliation operator  is formally related to the present concept of a
judgment transformation function. I conclude with a brief discussion of how
the present work is related to game-theoretic works on deliberation.
3Systematicity adds to this a neutrality requirement, as formally dened below.
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2 Opinions as judgments on propositions
How can the opinions held by a group of individuals at a given time be
modelled? In this section, I explain how to model them as judgments on
propositions expressed in logic (following List and Pettit 2002 and Dietrich
forthcoming). I turn to their aggregation and transformation subsequently.
The ingredients of the model are the following. There is a group of in-
dividuals, labelled 1; 2; :::; n. The set of propositions considered by them is
called the agenda. Propositions are represented by sentences, denoted p, q;
r, ..., from propositional logic or a more general language.4 Propositional
logic can express atomic propositions, without logical connectives, and com-
pound propositions, with the logical connectives not, and, or, if-then
and if and only if. Atomic propositions are denoted a, b, c, ...; examples
of compound propositions are a and b, if a or b, then not c. As is stan-
dard in logic, one can distinguish between consistent and inconsistent sets of
propositions.5
Each individuals opinions (at a given time) are represented by a judg-
ment set : the set of all those propositions in the agenda that the individual
accepts.6 On the standard interpretation, to accept proposition pmeans to
believe p; thus judgments are binary cognitive attitudes. (Alternatively, to
accept pcould mean to desire p; judgments would then be binary emotive
4Formally, the agenda is a subset X of the logic, where (i) X is closed under negation
(if pis in X, then so is not p), (ii) not not pis identied with p, and (iii) X contains
no tautological or contradictory propositions. Instead of propositional logic, any logic
with some minimal properties can be used, including expressively richer logics such as
predicate, modal, deontic and conditional logics (Dietrich forthcoming).
5In propositional logic, a set of propositions is consistent if all its members can be
simultaneously true, and inconsistent otherwise. For example, fa, a or bg is a consistent
set, whereas fa, not ag and fa, if a then b, not bg are not. More generally, consistency
is denable in terms of a more basic notion of logical entailment (Dietrich forthcoming).
6Formally, individual is judgment set is a subset Ji of the agenda X.
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attitudes.) A judgment set is consistent if it is a consistent set of proposi-
tions and complete if it contains a member of each proposition-negation pair
in the agenda. A combination of judgment sets across all the individuals in
the group is called a prole.7
Let me give some examples of agendas of propositions on which groups
of individuals may make judgments.
Example 1: Climate change. A panel of experts deliberates about
climate change. The agenda on which the experts make judgments contains
the following propositions and their negations: Global CO2 emissions are
above 6500 million metric tons of carbon per annum(a); If global CO2
emissions are above this threshold, then the global temperature will increase
by at least 1.2oC by 2030(if a then b); The global temperature will increase
by at least 1.2oC by 2030(b).8
Example 2: A tenure case. A university committee deliberates about
whether to grant tenure to a junior academic. The agenda on which the
committee members make judgments contains the following propositions and
their negations: The candidate is excellent at teaching(a); The candidate
is excellent at research (b); Excellence at both teaching and research is
necessary and su¢ cient for tenure(c if and only if (a and b)); The candidate
should be given tenure(c).9
Example 3: Ranking candidates or policy options. A political
decision-making body (e.g., a legislature, committee or electorate) deliberates
about how to rank three or more candidates or policy options in an order
of social preference. The agenda on which the individuals make judgments
contains all propositions of the form x is preferable to yand their negations,
7Formally, a prole is an n-tuple (J1; J2; :::; Jn).
8Variants of this example appear across the literature on judgment aggregation.
9This example is due to Bovens and Rabinowicz (2006).
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where x and y are distinct candidates or options from some set of available
ones and is preferable tois a binary relation, with the rationality constraints
on preferences built into the (predicate) logic.10
Example 4: Group membership. A club, society or association de-
liberates about which candidates from a list of three or more available ones
should be granted membership, subject to the constraint that some, but not
all, candidates should be granted membership. The agenda on which the in-
dividuals make judgments contains all propositions of the form candidate j
should be granted membershipand their negations, where j is any available
candidate and where the mentioned constraint is built into the logic.11
Each of these agendas exhibits certain logical connections between propo-
sitions. By contrast, trivialagendas such as those containing only a single
proposition-negation pair are not typical in deliberative settings. To set them
aside, I assume throughout the paper that the agenda is at least minimally
complex in a sense that is satised in all the examples but whose technical
details are not central for the exposition.12
10For details, see Dietrich and List (forthcoming-a), drawing on List and Pettit (2004).
11The conjunction of the propositions in quotes is stipulated to be false and their dis-
junction to be true. The example is due to Kasher and Rubinstein (1997).
12Formally, I assume that (i) the agenda has an inconsistent subset of three or more
propositions that becomes consistent upon removing one or more propositions, and (ii) it
is not (nor isomorphic to) a set of propositions whose only logical connectives are notand
if and only if(Dokow and Holzman 2005, Dietrich and List forthcoming-a). Properties (i)
and (ii) are met in examples 1 to 4. For instance, the agenda containing a, if a then b, b
and negations (example 1) satises (i) because its three-member inconsistent subset fa;if
a then b;not bg becomes consistent if one proposition is removed; it obviously satises
(ii). In examples 2 to 4, a further property is met, which I assume only where explicitly
stated: (iii) any proposition in the agenda can be deduced from any other proposition in
it via a sequence of pairwise conditional entailments (Nehring and Puppe 2002).
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3 The aggregation of judgments
Before I formally dene the problem of judgment transformation, it is useful
to recapitulate the problem of judgment aggregation: How can each prole
of individual judgment sets on a given agenda be aggregated into a collective
judgment set? This problem arises, for example, in referenda involving mul-
tiple propositions, in legislatures or committees deciding what factual and
normative propositions to accept in legislation, in multi-member courts re-
solving cases on the basis of several premises, and in expert panels seeking
to merge several scientic viewpoints into a collective viewpoint.
As illustrated in Figure 1, an aggregation function is a function that
maps each prole of individual judgment sets in some domain to a collective
judgment set.13
Figure 1: Judgment aggregation
Examples of aggregation functions are majority voting, where each propo-
sition is collectively accepted if and only if it is accepted by a majority of
individuals; supermajority or unanimity rules, where each proposition is col-
13While a judgment aggregation function, as dened in List and Pettit (2002), goes back
to Arrowian social choice theory, a related concept is that of a merging operator in belief
merging (Konieczny and Pino Pérez 2002). Parallels are discussed in Pigozzi (2006).
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lectively accepted if and only if it is accepted by a certain qualied majority
of individuals, for example, two thirds, three quarters, or all of them; and
dictatorships, where the collective judgment set is always the individual judg-
ment set of the same antecedently xed individual. Many other aggregation
functions have been proposed in the literature.
Although the possibilities seem abundant, it is surprisingly di¢ cult to
nd an aggregation function that guarantees consistent collective judgment
sets. Notoriously, majority voting can produce inconsistent collective judg-
ment sets even when all individual judgment sets are consistent an insight
which has become known as the discursive paradox(Pettit 2001, extending
Kornhauser and Sager 1986) and which generalizes Condorcets well-known
paradox of majority voting (List and Pettit 2004).
To illustrate, consider the climate change example above (example 1),
and suppose there are three experts on the panel, with opinions as shown
in Table 1. The rst expert judges that a, if a then band b; the second
judges that a, but not (if a then b)and not b; and the third judges that if
a then b, but not aand not b. Clearly, each expert holds an individually
consistent judgment set. Yet, the majority judgments are inconsistent: a ma-
jority accepts a, if a then band not b, an inconsistent set of propositions
in the standard sense of logic.
a if a then b b
Individual 1 True True True
Individual 2 True False False
Individual 3 False True False
Majority True True False
Table 1: A prole of individual judgment sets
Although this observation shows that majority voting on interconnected
propositions may generate inconsistent collective judgments, it leaves open
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the question of whether other aggregation functions are immune to this prob-
lem and, if so, which ones. The recent literature on judgment aggregation
has explored this question in great generality. One of the generic ndings is
that there exist no democratically appealing aggregation functions satisfying
the following conditions:
Universal domain. The aggregation function accepts as admissible
input any possible prole of consistent and complete individual judgment
sets.
Collective rationality. The aggregation function produces as output
consistent and complete collective judgment sets.
Unanimity preservation. If all individuals hold the same judgment
set, this is also the collective judgment set.
Independence/systematicity. The collective judgment on any propo-
sition p on the agenda depends only on individual judgments on p [and the
pattern of dependence is the same across propositions]. (Independence omits,
and systematicity includes, the clause in square brackets.)
Theorem 1 (Dietrich and List forthcoming-a, Dokow and Holzman 2005)
Any aggregation function satisfying universal domain, collective rationality,
unanimity preservation and independence/systematicity is a dictatorship of
one individual. (Whether the result requires independence or systematicity
depends on how the minimal complexity of the agenda is dened.14)
This theorem extends several earlier results (List and Pettit 2002, Nehring
and Puppe 2002, Pauly and van Hees 2006, Dietrich 2006). As it also applies
14If the agenda meets only properties (i) and (ii), systematicity is needed for the result;
if it also meets property (iii), independence is enough.
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to the example of ranking candidates or options (example 3 above), Arrows
impossibility theorem (1951/1963) on preference aggregation can be shown
to be a corollary.15
Obviously, a lot could be said about how to interpret the result. To
avoid the dictatorship conclusion, we must relax one of universal domain,
collective rationality, unanimity preservation or independence/systematicity.
All these routes have been discussed extensively in the literature. Arguably,
the relaxation of universal domain and of independence/systematicity are
the most promising routes. Since the focus of this paper is on deliberation
rather than aggregation, however, I set these issues aside here and return
to analogous issues in the discussion of judgment transformation. Theorem
1 su¢ ces to illustrate that, under conditions of pluralism, the aggregation
of individual judgments into collective ones raises a signicant, albeit not
insurmountable, challenge.
4 The transformation of judgments
To model the transformation (as opposed to aggregation) of judgments, only
one further concept is needed: that of a judgment transformation function.
As illustrated in Figure 2, a transformation function is a function that maps
each prole of individual judgment sets in some domain to a prole of indi-
vidual judgment sets in some co-domain (possibly the same as the domain).16
The input prole represents the individualsjudgments before deliberation,
15Formal constructions are given in Dietrich and List (forthcoming-a) and Dokow and
Holzman (2005). For earlier derivations of Arrow-like results from judgment and abstract
aggregation results, see Wilson (1975), List and Pettit (2004) and Nehring (2003).
16Just as a judgment aggregation function is related to a belief merging operator, so a
judgment transformation function is related to a belief conciliation operator, dened in
Gauwin, Konieczny and Marquis (2006). Pigozzis (2006) insights on the parellels between
judgment aggregation and belief merging apply, mutatis mutandis, to transformation too.
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the output prole their judgments after deliberation. The output judgments
may or may not di¤er from the input judgments, and the transformation may
or may not lead to consensus.
Figure 2: Judgment transformation
A simple example of a transformation function is deference to the major-
ity, where, after deliberation, each individual accepts all those propositions
that a majority accepts before deliberation. But just as majority voting as
an aggregation function fails to guarantee consistent collective judgments,
so deference to the majority as a transformation function fails to guarantee
consistent post-deliberation judgments (Pettit 2006). If each expert in the
climate change example were to defer to the majority judgments in Table 1,
for instance, the resulting post-deliberation judgments would be inconsistent.
An alternative to deference to the majority is deference to a superma-
jority or unanimity: here each individual accepts all those propositions after
deliberation that a certain qualied majority (perhaps everyone) accepts be-
fore deliberation. If the supermajority threshold is su¢ ciently large, such
a transformation function performs better than deference to a majority at
securing consistency (List 2006b), but it has problems of its own. First,
the individualspost-deliberation judgments will be incomplete on all those
12
issues on which there is no supermajority consensus; and second, they may
violate deductive closure: an individual may come to accept aand if a then
b, because each receives the required supermajority support, and yet fail to
accept b, because there is no supermajority consensus on b. Moreover,
it is hard to solve these two problems together. Only a unanimity thresh-
old can generally prevent violations of deductive closure (Dietrich and List
forthcoming-b), but it also amplies the incompleteness problem, because it
permits the acceptance of only those propositions on which there is perfect
consensus.
Other examples of transformation functions are opinion leader functions,
where each individual adopts as his or her output judgment set the input
judgment set of an antecedently xed individual, the individuals opinion
leader. The opinion leader may di¤er for di¤erent individuals or be the
same across individuals. In the latter case, the opinion leader function is
the deliberative analogue of a dictatorial aggregation function. Finally, a
degenerate transformation function is the identity function, where the output
prole is always the same as the input prole: nobody ever changes his or
her judgments. Below I introduce some other transformation functions.
Just as the theory of judgment aggregation seeks to characterize the log-
ical space of possible aggregation functions satisfying various conditions, so
I now want to explore the logical space of possible transformation functions
satisfying certain conditions. This exercise is interesting from two perspec-
tives. From a normative perspective, deliberative democrats have proposed
a number of desiderata that a good deliberative process should meet. By for-
malizing these desiderata as conditions on a transformation function, we may
ask whether they can be met together and what a transformation function
looks like that meets them all. From a positive perspective, several e¤ects
of group deliberation on individual opinions are empirically known, rang-
ing from deliberation-induced meta-agreement(List, Luskin, Fishkin and
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McLean 2000/2006) to deliberation-induced group polarization (Sunstein
2002). By formalizing such e¤ects as conditions satised by the underlying
transformation function, we may investigate what transformation functions
explain those empirically observed e¤ects. While my model is consistent with
either of these interpretations, the results provable in it must obviously be
viewed di¤erently depending on whether the conditions on a transformation
function are interpreted normatively or positively.
5 An impossibility result
Let me introduce some conditions on a transformation function. Although
each condition can be made plausible, I do not suggest that they are all
equally compelling; indeed, I relax some of them below. However, they are
useful for analysing the logical space of possible transformation functions.
Universal domain. The transformation function accepts as admissible
input any possible prole of consistent and complete individual judgment
sets.
Universal domain requires the transformation function to cope with con-
ditions of pluralism on the input side, subject to the constraint of full in-
dividual rationality. A more demanding input condition would require the
transformation function to cope even with less than fully rational individual
judgments; but the main result below shows that even the present require-
ment is far from undemanding.
Rational co-domain. The transformation function produces as output
a prole of consistent and complete individual judgment sets.
Rational co-domain requires the transformation function to produce out-
put proles that also meet the constraint of full individual rationality. Below
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I also consider a weaker variant of this requirement.
Unanimity preservation. The transformation function maps any unan-
imous prole to itself.
Unanimity preservation requires that, if the individuals agree on all propo-
sitions on the agenda before deliberation, this all-way consensus be preserved
after deliberation. This is distinct from either of the following, arguably less
plausible conditions. The rst is unanimity generation, the requirement that
the transformation function map every prole to a unanimous prole, as
captured by Elsters quote in the introduction to this paper. Although en-
dorsed by many deliberative democrats, especially those of a Habermasian
orientation, this requirement seems unduly demanding and empirically unre-
alistic. The second condition from which unanimity preservation is distinct
is propositionwise unanimity preservation, the requirement that if all indi-
viduals agree on a particular proposition p before deliberation, without
necessarily agreeing on other propositions, this consensus on pbe preserved
after deliberation. This requires that even an incompletely theorized agree-
ment on pbe preserved in deliberation, even if di¤erent individuals agree
on pfor incompatible reasons. Such a requirement is neither normatively
compelling nor empirically realistic.17 For example, upon noticing that you
and I support pfor incompatible reasons, we may each decide to give up
our belief in p. By contrast, unanimity preservation is the much milder
requirement that an all-way consensus on everything in those rare cases in
which it occurs be stable under deliberation.
To state the next condition, call two proles variants for a given individual
if they coincide for all individuals except the given one.
17On incompletely theorized agreements, see Sunstein (1994) and, in the context of judg-
ment aggregation, List (2006a). For critiques of propositionwise unanimity preservation,
see Bradley (2007), Mongin (2005) and Nehring (2005).
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Minimal relevance. For each individual, there exists at least one ad-
missible pair of variant proles for which the individuals output judgment
sets di¤er.
Minimal relevance is the mild requirement that individuals do not always
ignore their pre-deliberation judgments. It only rules out that an individuals
pre-deliberation judgments never make any di¤erence to his or her post-
deliberation judgments. It does not require those pre-deliberation judgments
to make a di¤erence more than once, nor does it say anything about how
they should make a di¤erence. Consistently with minimal relevance, the
individuals post-deliberation judgments could even respond negatively to
his or her pre-deliberation judgments.
Independence/systematicity. Each individuals output judgment on
any proposition on the agenda depends only on the individualsinput judg-
ments on that proposition [and the pattern of dependence is the same across
propositions]. (Again, independence omits, and systematicity includes, the
clause in square brackets.)
Independence is a requirement of local(as opposed to holistic) deliber-
ation: the post-deliberation judgments on any proposition should be deter-
mined by pre-deliberation judgments on that proposition alone and should
not depend on pre-deliberation judgments on other propositions. (System-
aticity adds to this a neutrality requirement across propositions.) In the cli-
mate change example, independence requires, for instance, that individuals
post-deliberation judgments on whether emissions above the relevant thresh-
old would lead to the specied temperature increase (if a then b) depend only
on pre-deliberation judgments on this proposition and not on pre-deliberation
judgments on, say, whether emissions are in fact above the threshold (a). In
the group membership example, to give another illustration, independence
16
requires that post-deliberation judgments on whether a particular candidate
should be granted membership depend only on pre-deliberation judgments
regarding this candidate, not on pre-deliberation judgments regarding other
candidates.
Whether one considers independence compelling depends, from a norma-
tive perspective, on whether a focus on one proposition at a time is deemed
desirable in deliberation and, from a positive perspective, on whether real-
world deliberative processes display such a focus. Regardless of its intrin-
sic appeal, independence can be justied instrumentally by appealing to a
strategy-proofness requirement, that is, the requirement that, when individu-
als choose whether or not to reveal their judgments truthfully in deliberation,
truthfulness be a weakly dominant strategy. Under su¢ ciently permissive as-
sumptions about individual incentives, strategy-proofness is met if and only
if the transformation function satises independence and a further condition
called monotonicity.18 This can be shown by adapting related results on
aggregation (Dietrich and List forthcoming-c, Nehring and Puppe 2002). If
one considers strategy-proofness desirable, as many deliberative democrats
do, one may therefore have to endorse independence too.
Although these conditions may seem plausible baseline requirements on
deliberation, it turns out that only a maximally conservative deliberative
process can meet them all. Recall that the identity function is the transfor-
mation function that maps every prole to itself.
Theorem 2 Any transformation function satisfying universal domain, ra-
tional co-domain, unanimity preservation, minimal relevance and indepen-
dence/systematicity is the identity function. (As before, whether the result
18Monotonicity requires that any individuals post-deliberation acceptance of a given
proposition should not be reversed if, in the pre-deliberation prole, one additional indi-
vidual supports the proposition, with other individualsjudgments remaining xed.
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requires independence or systematicity depends on how the minimal complex-
ity of the agenda is dened.19)
Proof. Consider any transformation function satisfying the conditions
of Theorem 2. Notice that the transformation function can be decomposed
into n separate functions, where the i-th such function maps each prole of
individual judgment sets in the domain of the transformation function to
individual is output judgment set. Formally, each of these n functions be-
ing a mapping from proles of judgment sets to single judgment sets is an
aggregation function; interpretational issues can be set aside here. Since the
underlying transformation function satises universal domain, rational co-
domain, unanimity preservation and independence/systematicity (minimal
relevance is not yet used), each induced aggregation function satises uni-
versal domain, collective rationality (here meaning rationality of the output
judgment sets), unanimity preservation and independence/systematicity. By
Theorem 1 above, it is therefore a dictatorship of one individual.20 This al-
ready shows that the underlying transformation function must be an opinion
leader function, where each individual adopts as his or her output judgment
set the input judgment set of some antecedently xed individual, his or her
opinion leader (or dictatorin the terminology of the induced aggregation
function). Could any individuals opinion leader be distinct from the indi-
vidual him- or herself? If this were the case, minimal relevance would be
violated contrary to the proofs assumption, because the individuals out-
put judgment set would be invariant under any changes of his or her input
judgment set. Each individual must therefore be his or her own opinion
leader. Consequently, the transformation function is the identity function.
19Again, if the agenda meets only properties (i) and (ii), systematicity is needed for the
result; if it also meets property (iii), independence is enough.
20The qualications regarding independence and systematicity in the footnote to The-
orem 1 apply here too and thus carry over to Theorem 2.
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This completes the proof.
Theorem 2 is clearly an impossibility result, showing that successful
group deliberation is impossible under the given conditions. The result casts
doubt on these conditions. First, from a normative perspective, one does
not want to impose conditions on deliberation that are so restrictive as to be
met only by a degenerate deliberative process in which nobody ever changes
his or her judgments. This would obviously be against the spirit of the
normative literature on deliberative democracy. Further, Theorem 2 imme-
diately implies that the ve introduced conditions are inconsistent with the
further condition of unanimity generation discussed above and implicit in
many writings on deliberative democracy, as illustrated by Elsters opening
quote. Therefore, if one did want deliberation to produce unanimity, one
could not also expect it to meet the ve introduced conditions.
Secondly, from an empirical perspective, it is simply not true that group
deliberation exhibits the extreme conservatism implied by the theorem. There
is plenty of empirical evidence that opinions do change in deliberation; more
on this later. Let me therefore go through the conditions one by one and
consider relaxing them.
6 Escape routes
6.1 Relaxing universal domain
Universal domain requires the transformation function to cope with any level
of pluralism in its input, subject only to the constraint of individual ratio-
nality. What happens if this is weakened to the requirement that it should
cope only with those input proles that exhibit a certain amount of cohe-
sion among the individuals? Then there exist transformation functions other
than the identity function that satisfy all the other conditions. An example
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is deference to the majority, which guarantees consistent post-deliberation
judgments provided only proles are deemed admissible in which there are
no distinct majorities supporting mutually inconsistent propositions. Could
pre-deliberation judgments exhibit this amount of cohesion?
Suppose, for example, that even before deliberation the individuals agree
on some cognitive or ideological dimension in terms of which to think about
the propositions on the agenda a meta-agreement(List 2002, 2003) and
that, in consequence, they can be aligned from left to right on that dimension
such that, for each proposition on the agenda, the individuals accepting the
proposition lie either all to the left, or all to the right, of those rejecting
it. Deference to the majority is then guaranteed to yield consistent and
(absent ties) complete post-deliberation judgments. Consider, for example,
the individual judgments over the agenda containing a, if a then band b
as shown in Table 2, where the required left-right alignment of the individuals
(here from 1 to 5) holds.
Ind. 1 Ind. 2 Ind. 3 Ind. 4 Ind. 5
a True False False False False
if a then b False True True True True
b False False False True True
Table 2: Unidimensionally aligned judgments
Notice that the majority judgments in Table 2 coincide with the judg-
ments of the median individual relative to the left-right alignment, here in-
dividual 3. Generally, given any prole of the form described, no proposition
can be supported by a majority unless it is also supported by the median
individual. So, by deferring to the majority, individuals inherit the consistent
judgments of the median individual.21
21Assuming full rationality of that individual, in accordance with universal domain.
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Figure 3: Single-peaked ranking judgments
Another type of cohesion that is su¢ cient for consistent majority judg-
ments applies to ranking judgments, as in example 3 above. Note that an
individuals set of ranking judgments can be viewed as expressing a ranking
of the given candidates or options from most to least preferable. Let some
left-right ordering of these candidates/options be given; this could order them
from most socialist to most capitalist, from most secular to most religious,
from most urban to most rural, or in any other way. An individuals set of
ranking judgments is called single-peaked relative to that left-right ordering if
the individual has a most highly ranked candidate/option somewhere on the
ordering with a decreasing ranking as candidates/options get more distant
from it in either direction. This is illustrated by the two rankings in Figure 3
of the options x, y, z, v, w from most (1st) to least (5th) preferable. A prole
(across individuals) is called single-peaked if there exists a left-right ordering
of the candidates/options relative to which all individuals ranking judg-
ment sets are single-peaked. A classic result by Black (1948) shows that,
for any single-peaked prole of ranking judgments, the resulting majority
judgments are consistent. Consequently, if pre-deliberation ranking judg-
ments are single-peaked, individuals can form consistent post-deliberation
judgments by deferring to the majority.
21
Does such pre-deliberation cohesion provide a plausible escape route from
the impossibility result on judgment transformation? Although
pre-deliberation proles may sometimes exhibit the required amount of co-
hesion, this cannot generally assumed to be the case. Often the aim of
deliberation is precisely to deal with pluralism. While consensus, or some
other form of cohesion, may ideally be the output of deliberation, requiring it
as its input appears to miss the point of deliberation. Nonetheless, one pos-
sible interpretation of the impossibility result is that, if rational co-domain,
unanimity preservation, minimal relevance and independence/systematicity
are required, then non-degenerate judgment transformation is possible only
if individuals enter the process with su¢ cient initial cohesion.
6.2 Relaxing rational co-domain
Rational co-domain requires the individualsoutput judgment sets to be both
consistent and complete. Suppose this is weakened to the requirement that
output judgment sets be merely consistent and deductively closed, where
deductive closure means that individuals accept the implications of other
accepted propositions, at least when they are also contained in the agenda.
Deductive closure is much less demanding than completeness, as it is satised,
for example, even by an empty judgment set. Requiring deductive closure
in a deliberative setting is plausible (at least when conned to propositions
on the agenda) because a frequently stated aim of deliberation is not just to
lead people to form considered judgments on various propositions but also
to make them aware of the implications of their judgments.
What happens if rational co-domain is relaxed in this way? Unfortu-
nately, it does not open up a compelling escape route from the impossibil-
ity result. Any transformation function satisfying the weakened co-domain
condition together with the other conditions (universal domain, unanimity
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preservation, minimal relevance, independence/systematicity) is of the fol-
lowing form. For each individual, there exists a xed subset of individuals
in which he or she is included  his or her peer group (in the limiting
case, this could be the singleton set of the individual him- or herself) such
that the individuals output judgment set is always the intersection of the
input judgment sets among the individuals peers. This is a corollary of a
recent result on judgment aggregation without full rationality (Dietrich and
List 2006, generalizing Gärdenfors 2006).22 Arguably, such a transformation
function is no better, and possibly worse, than the identity function: it has
the property that each individuals output judgment set is always a subset
of the individuals input judgment set. At best an individuals judgment
set remains unchanged after deliberation, at worst it shrinks. How much it
shrinks depends on the size of the individuals peer group and the amount
of disagreement among the peers. Such a transformation function perhaps
instantiates the combination of a conservative and a sceptical attitude: an
individual never comes to accept a proposition he or she did not accept in
the rst place and never continues to accept a proposition unless everyone in
his or her peer group agrees with it.
6.3 Relaxing unanimity preservation
Unanimity preservation is the requirement that the transformation function
map any unanimous prole to itself. Relaxing this requirement is not a
very promising route. First, the requirement is already very mild, as argued
above. But, secondly, even if one were prepared to drop it, this would not
lead very far: under slightly stronger assumptions about how the propositions
22The result still holds if the transformation function admits as input any possible prole
of consistent and deductively closed judgment sets (not requiring completeness); here even
a weakened independence/systematicity condition su¢ ces for the result (Dietrich and List
2006). For an equivalent result in abstract aggregation, see Dokow and Holzman (2006).
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on the agenda are interconnected, Theorem 2 continues to hold even without
unanimity preservation.23 I therefore set this route aside here.
6.4 Relaxing minimal relevance
Minimal relevance rules out that an individuals pre-deliberation judgment
set never makes any di¤erence to his or her post-deliberation judgment set.
As in the case of unanimity preservation, relaxing minimal relevance does
not lead to a strong escape route from the impossibility theorem. Not only is
minimal relevance a mild requirement, but, as shown in the proof of Theorem
2, its relaxation makes possible only a very restrictive class of transformation
functions, namely that of opinion leader functions. Under an opinion leader
function, each individual adopts as his or her output judgment set the input
judgment set of an antecedently xed individual, the individuals opinion
leader. As noted, an opinion leader function is analogous to a dictatorial
aggregation function except that di¤erent individuals may defer to di¤erent
opinion leaders. Obviously, such a transformation function is plausible at
most in special circumstances, for example when individuals have reasons to
think that their opinion leaders have a special expertise on the agenda of
propositions under consideration.
6.5 Relaxing independence/systematicity
Independence requires the transformation function to determine the output
judgment on any proposition solely on the basis of the individuals input
judgments on that proposition, with systematicity requiring in addition that
23If systematicity is required, the relevant agenda assumption is the conjunction of (i),
(ii) and a property called asymmetry ; this follows from a result by Dietrich (forthcoming).
If only independence is required, the relevant agenda assumption is atomic closure or
atomicity ; this follows from results by Pauly and van Hees (2006) and Dietrich (2006).
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the pattern of dependence be the same across propositions. As noted above,
this can be viewed as a constraint of localdeliberation, requiring the consid-
eration of one proposition at a time. Given the limited appeal of the previous
escape routes from the impossibility result, it seems natural to relax this re-
quirement.
If we give it up, one possibility is for each individual to designate some
propositions on the agenda as premises and others as conclusions and
to generate his or her post-deliberation judgments by deferring to the pre-
deliberation majority judgment on each premise and then deriving the judg-
ments on other propositions from these majority judgments on the premises.
If the premises are chosen as a logical basisfor the entire agenda that is,
they are mutually independent and any assignment of truth-values to them
settles the truth-values of all other propositions  the resulting transfor-
mation function guarantees consistent and complete post-deliberation judg-
ments and satises all the other conditions introduced above. The choice of
premises and conclusions need not be the same across individuals.
While the present class of transformation functions is the judgment-
transformation analogue of the premise-based procedures in the context
of aggregation (e.g., Pettit 2001), a more general class of transformation
functions draws on the sequential priority proceduresof aggregation (e.g.,
List 2004). Here each individual determines a particular order of priority
among the propositions on the agenda, interpreting earlier propositions in
that order as epistemically (or otherwise) prior to later ones. The individual
then considers the propositions one-by-one in the chosen order and forms
his or her post-deliberation judgment on each proposition as follows. If the
pre-deliberation majority judgment on the proposition is consistent with the
judgments the individual has made on propositions considered earlier, then
he or she defers to that pre-deliberation majority judgment; but if it is incon-
sistent with those earlier judgments, then he or she accepts the implications
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of those earlier judgments. In the case of Table 1, for example, an individual
may consider the propositions in the order a, if a then b, b(with nega-
tions interspersed) and then accept aand if a then bby deferring to the
pre-deliberation majority judgments while accepting bby logical inference.
The output prole under such a transformation function is sensitive to each
individuals chosen order of priority among the propositions. This property
of the transformation function can be seen as a virtue or as a vice, depend-
ing on ones perspective. On the one hand, it takes into account the fact
that di¤erent propositions may have a di¤erent status (Pettit 2001, Chap-
man 2002). But on the other hand, it makes individuals manipulable by a
cunning Rikerian heretheticianwho leads them to consider propositions in
a strategically adjusted order (Riker 1986, List 2004). In the next section, I
discuss a third class of transformation functions that becomes possible once
independence/systematicity is dropped.
What is the cost of violating independence? As already noted, a trans-
formation function violating it may provide incentives for strategic misrepre-
sentation of pre-deliberation judgments. To illustrate, consider the climate
change example with individual judgments as shown in Table 1, and suppose
the experts form their post-deliberation judgments in the sequential manner
just explained, considering the propositions in the order a, if a then b, b.
Suppose, further, that the second expert, who does not accept that there
will be the specied temperature increase (proposition b), does not want
his or her colleagues to accept that proposition either. Under the sequen-
tial transformation function, he or she may lead them to accept not bby
misrepresenting his or her judgment on a, strategically expressing the view
that not a. It can be shown that such possibilities of strategic manipulation
arise as soon as the transformation function violates independence (adapting
Dietrich and List forthcoming-c). The impossibility theorem presented can
therefore also be seen as describing a dilemma between two problems of a
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deliberative process: maximal conservatism on the one hand and strategic
manipulability on the other.
7 Away from consensus
While it is sometimes held that group deliberation should bring about con-
sensus, there is very little empirical evidence of this e¤ect. It is also unclear
whether achieving consensus is always normatively desirable. Moreover, if
we impose unanimity generation as a condition on a transformation func-
tion, then the problem of judgment transformation formally collapses into
that of judgment aggregation, and the only transformation functions sat-
isfying universal domain, rational co-domain, unanimity preservation and
independence/systematicity dropping minimal relevance are those opin-
ion leader functions in which all individuals defer to the same opinion leader,
the equivalent of an Arrowian dictator. This is particularly ironic in so far
as the possibility of a deliberation-induced consensus is often proposed as a
solution to, not a variant of, the notorious problem of aggregation.
Could deliberation bring about something less than consensus that is
still helpful for democratic decision-making for example, by facilitating the
consistent aggregation of post-deliberation judgments?
A recent literature suggests that deliberation may have this e¤ect, at least
under favourable conditions (Miller 1992, Knight and Johnson 1994, Dryzek
and List 2003). Recall the earlier discussion of the possibility that individ-
uals agree on some cognitive or ideological dimension in terms of which to
think about the relevant propositions or, in the case of ranking judgments,
the candidates or policy options. While such meta-agreementmay be too
demanding as a pre-condition for deliberation, it can more plausibly be ex-
pected as the outcome of deliberation. In an empirical study using data from
Fishkins deliberative polls (List, Luskin, Fishkin and McLean 2000/2006),
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such an e¤ect has been identied. Groups of between 150 and 350 randomly
sampled participants were interviewed on their ranking judgments over mul-
tiple policy options both before and after a period of group deliberation.
Deliberation increased the proximity of these ranking judgments to single-
peakedness, as dened above  a deliberation-induced movement towards
meta-agreement.
Can we nd an empirically plausible class of transformation functions to
explain this e¤ect? Let me dene the class of constrained minimal revision
functions. Under such a function, the transformation of judgments takes
place in two stages. An input prole is given. In the rst stage, the group
identies a particular set of judgment sets that are deemed admissible as
output judgment sets conditional on the given input prole. Formally, this
can be modelled as the application of a focusing function, which maps the
input prole to a set of admissible output judgment sets. The latter set
should ideally have the property that any prole constructible from it leads
to consistent majority judgments. In the second stage, each individual selects
an output judgment set from the identied set of admissible ones. Formally,
this can be modelled as the application of a minimal judgment revision
policy, under which each individual chooses an output judgment set from
the set of admissible ones that is as close as possible to his or her input
judgment set, relative to some distance metric over judgment sets (on the
notion of minimal revision, see Schulte 2005). This xes the output prole
and thereby completes the denition.
Informally, the rst stage involves the identication of the opinions that
can reasonably be held after deliberation given the opinions before delibera-
tion; and the second stage involves a change of individual opinions such that
each individual ends up holding one of the reasonable ones. Whether an indi-
viduals post-deliberation opinion coincides with his or her pre-deliberation
opinion depends on whether it was already among the ones identied as
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reasonable in the rst stage.
Crucially, two ingredients of this denition allow a number of di¤erent
specications: the groups focusing function in the rst stage, and each indi-
viduals distance metric over judgment sets in the second. Thus the deni-
tion species an entire class of transformation functions, one for each possible
specication of these two ingredients.
To illustrate how a constrained minimal revision function can bring about
a meta-agreement, suppose again a group deliberates about how to rank
three or more policy options in an order of social preference (example 3),
as in the deliberative polls studied empirically. The following constrained
minimal revision function generates single-peaked output proles. For a given
pre-deliberation prole, it is rst determined which left-right ordering of the
options renders a maximal number of individuals ranking judgment sets
single-peaked, as dened above.24 Now a ranking judgment set is deemed
admissible if and only if it is single-peaked relative to the identied left-right
ordering. This species the groups focusing function and completes the rst
stage. Each individual then minimally revises his or her ranking judgment
set so as to adopt one of the admissible ones; here an individuals distance
metric could be the Hamming distance, whereby the distance between any
two judgment sets is the number of propositions on the agenda on which these
judgment sets disagree.25 This determines the post-deliberation prole and
completes the second stage. By construction, this transformation function
guarantees a single-peaked output prole.
Further empirical research is needed to conrm that a suitable constrained
minimal revision function can explain the precise patterns of deliberation-
24In List, Luskin, Fishkin and McLean (2000/2006), such a left-right ordering is called
a largest structuring dimension.
25The Hamming distancehas been employed in the literature on judgment aggregation
by Pigozzi (2006).
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induced opinion change observed in deliberative polls and other experiments.
To the best of my knowledge, however, the present approach is the rst
attempt to model a deliberation-induced meta-agreementformally.
From a normative perspective, further questions need to be asked on
whether a suitable constrained minimal revision function captures the re-
quirements of a good deliberative process as discussed in the literature on
deliberative democracy. A constrained minimal revision function satises
universal domain, rational co-domain, unanimity preservation and minimal
relevance, while violating independence/systematicity, but does it also satisfy
some other desiderata of good deliberation?
Obviously, it does not satisfy unanimity generation, except when the fo-
cusing function picks out only one admissible output judgment set for each
input prole. What about other conditions? As already illustrated, a con-
strained minimal revision function may satisfy cohesion generation, where
a prole is dened to be cohesive if it generates consistent majority judg-
ments. Cohesion generation is a particularly appealing condition when the
deliberative process is expected to lead to a democratic decision.
Another condition is stability under repeated rounds of deliberation, the
requirement that the transformation function map any output prole (that
is, any prole in the functions range) to itself, or equivalently, that repeated
applications of the function lead to the same output as a single applica-
tion. Any transformation function satisfying both unanimity preservation
and unanimity generation also satises this condition, because its rst ap-
plication leads to unanimity and subsequent applications preserve this una-
nimity. By contrast, if the members of a group sit around a circular table
and each individual defers to his or her neighbour on the right in forming
post-deliberation judgments, then the resulting transformation function a
special kind of opinion leader function violates the stability condition, as
each round of deliberation yields a further permutation of the given pro-
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le across individuals. A constrained minimal revision function, however, is
stable under repeated rounds of deliberation so long as the groups focusing
function and the individualsdistance metrics are su¢ ciently well-behaved.26
Whether stability under repeated rounds of deliberation is a plausible
requirement depends on how the judgment transformation function is inter-
preted. If it is meant to capture opinion change in a single round of delib-
eration, then there is no reason to expect subsequent rounds of deliberation
to leave opinions xed. But if it is meant to capture a complete delibera-
tive process up to the point of reective equilibrium(Rawls 1971), then the
stability condition is plausible arguably more so than consensus generation.
8 Conclusion
I have formulated the problem of judgment transformation and presented a
baseline impossibility result. The framework and result allow us to determine
which combinations of conditions on a deliberative process are simultaneously
attainable and which are not. Among the ve basic conditions introduced,
the rst four, I have argued, can be relaxed only in special cases. The most
plausible candidate for relaxation under both normative and positives inter-
pretations of the model is the fth condition: independence/systematicity.
This observation suggests that realistic deliberative processes must ex-
hibit a certain kind of holism: Individuals cannot form their post-deliberation
judgments on each proposition based on pre-deliberation judgments on that
proposition alone, but must take into account pre-deliberation judgments on
other propositions too. This holistic property of group deliberation is anal-
26The focusing function must have the property that it maps any output prole con-
structed from any set of judgment sets in its range to a new set of judgment sets that still
contains all the judgment sets in the given output prole. The distance metric must have
the standard property that the distance of any judgment set from itself is uniquely zero.
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ogous to the holistic property of theory testing in science. According to the
Duhem-Quine holismthesis in the philosophy of science (Quine 1951), one
cannot generally test a single proposition in isolation, but only in conjunction
with other propositions in a larger web of beliefs.
Let me conclude with some remarks about how the present approach is
related to game-theoretic approaches to studying deliberation. While game-
theoretic approaches seek to come up with a behavioural theory of group
deliberation, analysing individualsincentives in deliberation and predicting
their behaviour on that basis, the goal of the present approach is to illu-
minate the logical space of possible functional relations between pre- and
post-deliberation judgments. The present approach is thus more akin to
Arrowian social choice theory than to game theory, and the relationship be-
tween the two approaches is similar to that between social choice theory and
the theory of mechanism design. The former investigates possible functional
relations between individual preferences and social decisions and the latter
investigates the various mechanisms available (or unavailable) for implement-
ing these functional relations under certain incentive constraints. Therefore
I see the present approach as complementary to game-theoretic approaches,
not as competitive.
In addition, there are important bridges between the two approaches.
As already noted, the condition of independence can be motivated game-
theoretically, namely as a necessary condition (under certain assumptions)
for the incentive-compatibility of truthfulness in deliberation. Thus my
conclusion that realistic deliberative processes are likely to violate inde-
pendence reinforces a central question in game-theoretic work on deliber-
ation (e.g., Austen-Smith and Banks 2006): How can we design delibera-
tive processes that induce participants to reveal their judgments truthfully?
Broadly, there are at least two approaches towards this question. One may ei-
ther go along the mechanism-design route and ask what deliberative processes
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ensure truthfulness even when individuals are strategically motivated. Or one
may go along a psychological route and ask under what conditions individu-
als are truthful even in the presence of strategic incentives. Which of these
routes or perhaps which combination of them is most promising remains
an important question for future research.
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